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FOREWORD 
BIOTERRORISM: A POTENTIAL 
EXISTENTIAL THREAT 
BRIGADIER GENERAL MURRAY G, SAGSVEEN (RET,)* 
& 
SARAH M, BIRD NELSON** 
In 2005, former United States Senate Majority Leader William Frist 
claimed that "[t]he greatest existential threat we have in the world today is 
biologicaL"i Ycars later, bioterrorism remains a serious threat, creating a 
challenging public health, medical, economic, and national security issue 
for the United States and other countries across the globe, 
Bioterrorism is a form of asymmetrical warfare in which a terrorist, 
with biological expertise and modest means, could inflict great harm upon 
millions of innocent victims, Asymmetric warfare is a conflict between op-
ponents whose relative power significantly differs, which compels the 
weaker opponent to employ unconventional strategies or tactics? The 
Minutemen's strategy against the Redcoats-shooting at the snperior Brit-
ish forces from behind trees instead of confronting them in the open-is a 
classic early-American example of asymmetric warfare, 
The September 11, 2001, attacks on the World Trade Center and the 
Pentagon are another example of asymmetric warfare, Nineteen young Arab 
men-armed only with knives, box cutters, and pepper spray or Mace-
hijacked four planes, "turned them into deadly gnided missiles," and killed 
about three thousand innocent office workers, passengers, and aircraft 
:~ MUITay G. Sagsveen is the general counsel of the American Academy of Neurology, an 
international specialty medical society. Previously, he was chief executive officer of the North 
Dakota Department of Health, the Army National Guard Special Assistant to The Judge Advocate 
General of the Army, and a partner in a Bismarck, ND., law finn. 
** Sarah M. Bird Nelson is a staff attomey for the American Academy of Neurology. She 
graduated from the University of Sl. Thomas School of Law in 2009 and served as an articles 
editor for the Law Journal during the 2008-09 academic year. 
I. MILTON LEITENBERG, ASSESSING THE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS AND BrOTERRORlSM THREAT 
1 (2005), 
2. See Andrew J. R. Mack, Why Big Nations Lme Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric 
Conflict, WORLD POL., Jan. 1975, at 175-200. 
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crew. 3 In addition, one publicly-supportcd nonprofit organization estimated 
that the economic loss from property damage, lost production of goods and 
services, and loss in stock market wealth approached $2 trillion 4 
What would be the impact if terrorists employed biological agents in-
stead of hijacked aircraft? On October 15,2001, a letter containing anthrax 
spores was opened in the Hart Senate Office Building in Washington, D.C. 
The one letter impacted staff (about thirty congressional employees tested 
positive for anthrax exposure) and caused the closure of the Hart Building 
and several other government buildings along the mail delivery route and 
elsewhere. The cleanup costs to the Environmental Protection Agency were 
$27 million.s The Hart Building did not reopen until January 23, 2002. 
Instead of a non-contagious biological agent such as antill'ax, what if 
terrorists employed a contagious biological agent" An m'ticle in the New 
England Journal of Medicine explains how quickly the SARS epidemic 
raced around the globe in 2003: 
In terms of sheer drama, the emergence of the sevcre acute respir-
atory syndrome (SARS) rivaled the most exotic Michael Crichton 
thriller. A novel viral strain spread in "wet markets" from an ob-
scure animal to food handlers; through a rural province in south-
ern China; to Hong Kong by way of an ill Chinese physician who 
had traveled to attend a wedding; and in one night at a Hong 
Kong hotel, from that man to at least 12 other people. These 12 
returned to their five home countries and created multiple chains 
of transmissions that, over the course of the next four months, led 
to more than 8000 cases of SARS, resulting in almost 800 deaths 
in 27 countries, representing every continent.6 
Toronto provides an example of the devastating impacts of even a brief 
epidemic on a city. A 14-week epidemic in the city triggered quarantine 
measures for 30,000 persons who may have been exposed, closure of facili-
ties, and the issuance of international travel advisories by the World Health 
Organization (WHO) and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
(CDC). Ontario identified 375 probable SARS cases, and 44 ultimately 
died. Toronto also suffered an estimated $1 billion economic loss due to 
3. The 9111 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist 
Attacks Upon the United States, http://www.91lcommission.gov/reportJ911ReporcExcc.htm (last 
visited Dec. 2, 2009). 
4. Institute for the Analysis of Global SccLllity, How Much Did the September J 1 Terrorist 
Attack Cost America?, http://www.iags.org/costof911.htmi(last visited Dec. 2, 2009). 
5, U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF. REP. TO THE CHAIRMAN, CO:v[M1TTEE ON Fl:--<., U.S. SENATE, CAPI· 
TOL HILL ANTHRAX INCIDENT: EPA's CLEANUP WAS SUCCESSfUL; OPPORTUNITIES EXIST TO EN· 
HANCE CONTRACT OVERSIGHT 2 (2003). 
6. Robert A, Weinstein, PlwlIIil1gfor Epidemics-The Lessolls ofSARS, NEW ENG. J. MED" 
June 3, 2004, at 2332. 
2009J BIOTERRORISM: A POTENTIAL EXISTENTIAL THREAT 519 
lost jobs, the cancellation of nine city-wide conventions, and travel 
advisories. 7 
Bioterrorism clearly creates an extremely complicated public health, 
medical, and legal environment. Lethal, contagious pathogcns could be re-
leased in a city without warning, which would overtax the public health and 
medical infrastructure, create local panic, involve law enforcement to detect 
and prosecute the perpetrators, and possibly trigger national and interna-
tional restrictions to limit the spread of the epidemic. 
The articles in this symposium publication illustrate the interconnected 
and complex nature of the issues surroundi~g a bioten-orist attack. Repre-
senting legal, scientific, and military backgrounds, the authors collectively 
offer a comprehensive picture of what is-or at least should be-involved 
in preparing for and responding to such attacks. 
Keynote speaker Dr. Victoria Sutton, director of the Center for Bi-
odefense, Law and Public Policy at Texas Tech University School of Law, 
analyzes the regulatory system governing biodefense research. Professor 
Sutton examines the historical development of the select agent rules, the 
legal consequences for violating them, and how they have affected the bi-
odefense research community. Specifically, she discusses how biological 
agent regulation in the United States has increased over the past two de-
cades in response to incidents like the anthrax attacks in 2001, closing the 
gap between the criminal intent to use or attempt to use biological weapons 
and mere possession of select agents.' Noting that this heavily regulated 
environment can overburden scientific researchers and, in turn, thwart 
biodefense advancements, she observes a resulting tension between two le-
gitimate concerns: "The culture of the research scientist and the implemen-
tation of [select agent] regulatory mechanisms have led to a clash of 
interests-those of research for humankind and those of national seeurity."9 
She argues that the United States can arrive at a more balanced regulatory 
system if it shifts away from focusing primarily on select agents and how to 
control them through performance- or standards-based regulation-i.e., its 
current nonnative approach, riddled with loose guidance and dangerous ex-
ceptions-and instead focuses on other players, like the facilities that host 
the select agents and the individuals who handle them. Public health and 
safety and national security, she maintains, should be the regulatory driving 
forces. 10 While she admits that these dual goals give rise to an unavoidable 
7. GENE MATTHEW::;, THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE RESPONSE TO SUDDEN DISEASE Ol'TBREAK 4 
(2005). 
8. Victoria Sunon, The Culture of Science find the Regulation and Litigation of Biodefense 
Research, 6 U. ST. THOMAS LI 523, 526-27 (2009), 
9. [d. at 525. 
10. [d. at 547. 
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tension, she also points out that careful consideration of this tension can 
provide useful insights to lawmakers, regulators, and legal academicians. 11 
Professor Barry Kellman and Zachary Clopton, president and former 
research fellow of the International Security & Biopolicy Institute, respec-
tively, consider international anti-bioviolence initiatives to promote medical 
counter-measure (MCM) preparedness. Their decision to foclls on MCM 
preparedness stems from the notion that the ready availability and proper 
dissemination of MCMs can help contain the negative effects of bioterrorist 
incidents and, in turn, deter attacks.12 In addition, MCM preparedness en-
gages the international community, which, Kellman and Clopton contend, is 
critical to successful response efforts since bioviolencc is a global concern 
that demands global cooperation and collaboration. 13 They highlight some 
of the major legal challenges implicated in developing an effective interna-
tional MCM preparedness strategy and suggest ways to address them. Kell-
man and Clopton identify risk assessment and management as the first 
hurdle to overcome in the MCM planning process and discuss the possibil-
ity of creating an international task force to handle such preparedness ef-
forts. 14 Next, they explore the current lack of incentive to conduct MCM 
research and development. Recognizing that the costly, time-consuming, 
and risky nature of MCM research and development discourages drug man-
ufacturers from engaging in it, they consider liability protection and patent 
right clarification as mechanisms to counter this reality,l."; Kellman and 
Clopton then turn to MCM licensing and emergency approval, arguing that 
this legal roadblock can be averted if national and international licensing 
standards and regulations are determined before a bioviolence crisis oc-
curs. 16 FinallY, they consider MCM stockpiling and delivery planning; they 
posit that MCMs will only be valuable if rapidly delivered to bioviolence 
victims when needed and outline ways to .make this possible. 17 
Professors R. Gregory Evans and Rachel D. Schwartz of Saint Louis 
University School of Public Health's Institute for Biosecurity, discuss 
"preparedness and response paralysis"-what they define as "the point 
many planners reach where they find themselves lacking the resources, sup-
port, information, and leadership necessary to continue developing a con-
crete and actionable plan that can be implemented in the face of a particular 
type of disastel'''-and the factors that contribute to it, in the context of the 
11. Id. at 548. 
12. Barry Kellman & Zachary D, Clopton, A Glohal Architecture j()f MediclI[ CVllllfef-MC'u-
slIre Preparednen Against Biol'ivlencl!, 6 U. ST. THOMAS LJ. 550, 55-\.-55 ~2009). 
13. Id. at 555,558-59. 
14. hi. at 563-66. 
15. Id. aI566-72. 
16. Id. at 573-81. 
17. Id. at 582-91. 
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U.S. public health system. 18 They claim that bioterrorism is an area of par-
ticular concern to the nation's public health system when it comes to 
preparedness, owing in part to the accessibility of biological agents and the 
devastating harm they can inflict. 19 Because the consequences of being un-
derprepared are so grave, they argue that i~ is critical to develop a planning 
mechanism that overcomes the obstacles bioterrorism planners and re-
sponders (and pandemic planners and responders in general) presently en-
counter.20 They see the current structure of the U.S. public health system as 
one of the primary obstacles to effective preparedness efforts and suggest 
ways to develop a more streamlined system.2 ! They also view the lack of a 
process for decision-making in the public health sphere as a significant 
roadblock to successful response planning; a fair and transparent process, 
they contend, will facilitate critical decision-making and circumvent the pa-
ralysis that currently plagues preparation efforts22 
Professor Kavita M. Berger of the Center for Science, Technology and 
Security Policy at the American Association of the Advancement of Sci-
ence, describes the role of science and scientists in bioterrorism prepared-
ness and response efforts. Berger points out that scientists are responsible 
for accurately recognizing the symptoms of a disease, identifying the causa-
tive agents, and helping mount appropriate and timely public health re-
sponses to biological incidents.23 She also notes that scientists' 
development of medical countermeasures (e.g., vaccines) is a critical com-
ponent of biodefense preparedness and resJonse efforts, while touching on 
the legal and ethical challenges inherent in the research and development 
and dissemination processes. On the international security and biosafety 
front, Berger states that scientists throughout the world participate in impor-
tant policy discussions about oversight and education regarding dual-use 
research-research that is generally legitimate and beneficial but which 
could be misapplied for malicious purposes?4 While she recognizes the 
concerns that gave rise to U.S. programs and policies intended to combat 
nefarious uses, she warns that such protective efforts can, in fact, greatly 
hamper our nation's ability to help identify and respond to global public 
health threats.25 Echoing Professor Sutton, Berger argues that U.S. bioter-
rorism planning efforts should involve examining the impact of U.S. secur-
ity policies on national security, scientific advancement, and public health, 
18. R. Gregory Evans & Rachel D. Schwartz, Preparedness and Response Paralysis: Ramifi-
cations for Pandemic Planning, 6 U. ST. THOMAS LJ. 594, 595 (2009). 
19. ld. at 596-604. 
20. ld. at 604-06, 609-15. 
21. ld. at 615-20. 
22. ld. at 620-21. 
23. Kavita Marfatia Berger, The Role of Science In Preparedness and Response, 6 U. ST. 
THOMAS L.!. 622, 623-26 (2009). 
24. ld. at 626-33, 644-45. 
25. ld. at 634-45. 
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as well as attempt to build an effective working relationship between the 
security and scientific communities?6 
Lieutenant Colonel Larry A. Shireley, Commander of the 81st Na-
tional Guard Civil Support Team (CST) Dased out of North Dakota, dis-
cusses the role CSTs play in preparing for and responding to bioterrorist 
attacks. Shireley underscores the importance of CSTs in the bioterrorism 
landscape by noting that they are designed specifically to supply 2417 sup-
port to civilian first responders reacting to WMD terrorist attacks?7 If a 
state is attacked by a bioterrorist, for example, and the state's first respond-
ers' assessment reveals that they need more assistance, the state's coordi-
nating official can deploy a CST. Once deployed, Shireley explains, CSTs 
can further assess suspected biological events, help identify the biological 
agents, advise civilian responders about proper response actiuns, and facili-
tate requests for additional state and federal assistance through the coordi-
nation of their command, operations, administration/logistics, 
communications, medical, and survey sections28 Shireley concludes that if 
the United States is subject to a biological terrorist attack in the future, 
CSTs will be prepared to effectively respond to it29 
Though biological agents are literally microscopic in size, the reality 
that terrorists could use them to inflict harm far greater in magnitude makes 
bioterrorism a topic worthy of reflection. The following collection of arti-
cles will assist the reader with this endeavor, as it considers the subject 
from a variety of angles. Just as our society is multifaceted, so too should 
be our approach to an issue that could affect it so profoundly. So, one might 
reflect, are we ready for a bioterrorist attack? While historical experience 
and recent reports suggest that, as a nation, we still have work to do, engag-
ing in serious discussions about the legal, ethical, and practical issues sur-
rounding bioterrorism preparation and response efforts is certainly an 
important step in the right direction. 
26. lei. at 646. 
27. Lt. Col. Larry A. Shire!ey, National Guard CiI'i! Support Temlls: A 24/7 Response to 
Weopolls of Mm's Destruction, 6 U, ST. Tflotl-'!AS LJ. 647, 648~50 (2009). 
28. Id. at 650-57. 
29. See id. at 657. 
